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Abstract 
Sensory imagery is a powerful tool for inducing craving because it is a key component 
of the cognitive system that underpins human motivation. The role of sensory imagery in 
motivation is explained by Elaborated Intrusion (EI) theory. Imagery plays an important role 
in motivation because it conveys the emotional qualities of the desired event, mimicking 
anticipated pleasure or relief, and continual elaboration of the imagery ensures that the target 
stays in mind. We argue that craving is a conscious state, intervening between unconscious 
triggers and consumption, and summarise evidence that interfering with sensory imagery can 
weaken cravings. We argue that treatments for addiction can be enhanced by the application 
of EI theory to maintain motivation, and assist in the management of craving in high-risk 
situations.   
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Sensory imagery in craving:  
From cognitive psychology to new treatments for addiction 
Sensory imagery refers to our ability to mentally simulate the sight, sound, smell, taste, 
and feel of an experience. This imagery is emotive in a way that merely thinking about 
experiences is not: imagining distressing scenes increases anxiety relative to verbally thinking 
about them (Holmes & Mathews, 2005) while imagining positive scenes increases happiness 
(Holmes, Lang & Shah, 2008). The advertising industry is well aware of the power of sensory 
imagery to motivate consumer behaviour. Evocative descriptions of holiday resorts describe 
‘sun-kissed beaches’ and ‘turquoise waters’; food packaging lists the contents as ‘mouth 
watering’ and ‘juicy’. We respond to these positive sensory labels by forming mental images 
of the target, often in its idealized form, and we are then biased in our decision-making by the 
assumed properties of the ideal (rather than the actual) product, and by a cascade of affective 
reactions to our imagery. The power of sensory imagery is also illustrated by its use in 
laboratory research to stimulate or exacerbate craving for drugs. For example, Tiffany and 
Hakenewerth (1991) asked cigarette smokers to ‘imagine vividly’ audio tapes containing 
either explicit urge-related descriptions of smoking situations or neutral social situations, and 
found that their physiological responses (heart rate, skin conductance levels) and self-reported 
desire to smoke increased for the urge scripts compared to the neutral scripts. In a similar 
study, Tiffany and Drobes (1990) found that more vivid imagery of smoking scenarios was 
associated with stronger urges to smoke. Likewise, alcohol craving can be induced by asking 
clients to imagine entering their favorite bar, ordering, holding and tasting a cold, refreshing 
glass of their favourite beer; guided imagery such as this can be more successful at inducing 
cravings in the laboratory than actually showing people a real drink (Litt & Cooney, 1999).  
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We define craving as a type of desire, “an affectively charged cognitive event in which 
an object or activity that is associated with pleasure or relief of discomfort is in focal 
attention” (Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005, p.447). Craving is often, but not necessarily, a 
particularly strong and intense desire. There is concurrence across the literature that craving is 
a conscious, cognitive and emotional state (e.g., Field, Munafò & Franken, 2009; Robinson & 
Berridge, 2003; Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994), although (in common with other cognitive 
and emotional phenomena) people are not necessarily aware of its precursors or underlying 
processes. As the studies cited above illustrate, sensory imagery is a powerful tool for 
inducing craving. We argue that this is because imagery is a key component of the cognitive 
system that underpins human motivation in general. Imagery conveys the emotional qualities 
of the desired event, mimicking anticipated pleasure or relief, and continual elaboration of the 
imagery ensures that the target stays in mind. We contend that craving is a conscious state, 
intervening between unconscious triggers and consumption, and summarise evidence that 
interfering with sensory imagery can weaken cravings. We suggest that treatments for 
addiction may be enhanced by the application of imagery-based approaches to the 
maintenance of motivation and management of craving.  
Elaborated Intrusion theory 
The role of sensory imagery in motivation is explained by Elaborated Intrusion (EI) 
theory (Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005; May, Panabokke, Andrade & Kavanagh, 2004). 
According to this theory (see Figure 1), there are two components in an episode of craving, an 
initial apparently spontaneous intrusive thought (which may be a schematic thought, a verbal 
thought, or image) followed by a cycle of elaborative cognition.  
A wide range of stimuli of which we are most likely not focally aware, such as 
physiological cues (salivation, thirst, tiredness), negative mood, environmental cues, and 
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related thoughts, increase the likelihood that we will experience a conscious thought about the 
target of desire. The thought feels spontaneous, because we have been unaware of the 
precursor activity, which takes the form of automatic or overlearned associations that do not 
require conscious control. The thought is intrusive in the sense that, once conscious, it 
interrupts one’s train of thought, but in many cases it may be fleeting, for example when a 
momentary thought about lunch interrupts an interesting conversation. Even in a sample of 
people starting to address alcohol-related problems, when we might expect alcohol-related 
thoughts to capture attention, 87% reported that these thoughts sometimes popped into mind 
but then vanished without effort (Kavanagh, May & Andrade, 2009). 
Intrusive thoughts only become desires when they are elaborated, as might happen when 
a thought about drinking coffee interrupts one’s attention to a dull lecture. Elaboration 
includes planning ways of achieving the desire (‘I could buy a coffee), generating 
expectancies about satisfying the desire (‘I’d be able to concentrate better once I’ve had a 
coffee’), and thinking about one’s self-efficacy or ability to obtain the desired object or 
activity (‘I’ve got change for the coffee machine in the lobby’). Importantly, though, 
elaboration involves sensory imagery. We imagine engaging in the desired activity and the 
image conveys some of the pleasure or relief of the real thing. We imagine the sort of coffee 
we will buy, the warmth, smell and taste of it, and the satisfaction of relieving our craving. 
More vivid and realistic images convey greater pleasure, and help us decide whether we really 
want an espresso or cappuccino, but they also make us more acutely aware of the separation 
between our current state and desired state. Accordingly, vividness of imagery is associated 
with strength of craving across a range of substances and activities (Kavanagh, May & 
Andrade, 2009; May, Andrade, Kavanagh & Penfound, 2008). If the desire thought has arisen 
in situations where consummation is not immediately possible and deprivation is acute, this 
realization can be unpleasant or uncomfortable. Furthermore, if the desire conflicts with 
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higher-order goals about abstinence, one may feel guilty and weak for wanting it. Thus desire 
imagery is briefly pleasurable but may ultimately become aversive. This negative emotion 
motivates us to achieve our desire and change our current situation. 
[fig 1 about here] 
Craving as a conscious state 
Unconscious triggers lead to conscious intrusive thoughts 
EI theory views sensory imagery as a key component of consciously mediated 
substance use, as in other motivated behavior. We hypothesise that sensory imagery serves as 
a mental bridge between initial transitory thoughts about drug use and actual consumption, 
assisting with the direction of behavior by constructing potential future events, as well as 
motivating it. While craving can occur without imagery, it is imagery than provides a rich 
sensory experience that accentuates relief or pleasure and aggravates feelings of deficit.  
Craving for drugs can be triggered by drug-related stimuli in the environment (e.g., drug 
paraphernalia), related thoughts (e.g., thinking about a friend with whom one uses drugs), 
physiological withdrawal symptoms, anticipatory responses such as salivation, and negative 
mood. Negative mood is strongly associated with craving (Sayette & Huford, 1995; Maude-
Grifin & Tiffany, 1996; Robbins, Ehrman, Childress, Cornish, & O’Brien, 2000) and may 
become increasingly important as addiction develops and any negative mood is increasingly 
misattributed to lack of the drug. Development of attentional biases in addiction (Field & 
Cox, 2008) increases the likelihood that drug-related stimuli will be processed, and so trigger 
the intrusive thoughts that lead to substance craving, but there is no direct link. The 
relationship between attentional biases and craving is weaker than would be expected if a 
direct, automatic relationship existed (Field, Munafò & Franken, 2009). 
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Unconscious triggers do not lead directly to consumption but instead increase activation 
of drug-related information in memory, which in turn increases the likelihood of experiencing 
a thought about drug use. These intrusive thoughts may be verbal thoughts or image 
fragments, and may be fleeting (Kavanagh et al, 2009; May et al, 2004). Trying to suppress 
thoughts about consumption tends to exacerbate rather than reduce their occurrence, and also 
leads to increased consumption, a behavioural rebound (Erskine, 2008). Once a thought has 
been experienced consciously, consumption may follow directly with little further thought, if 
the situation permits; but it is more likely that the substance is not immediately to hand and 
that actions need to be undertaken to obtain it. This provides the window for elaboration to 
occur, or for the thought to pass from the person’s mind as new thoughts take precedence. 
Motivation is sustained by imagery-based elaboration of thoughts 
While passing thoughts can be experienced keenly, intense craving more typically 
involves elaboration. In this sense, intrusive thoughts are typically the gateway to prolonged 
or intense craving. As described above, elaboration includes many cognitive activities, 
including planning acquisition, evaluating self-efficacy in resisting craving, comparing 
conflicting goals, and generating expectancies of the effects of consumption. However, the 
key component that gives elaboration its greatest emotional bite, is sensory imagery.  
Imagining the sight, smell, taste and bodily effects of consuming the substance mimics 
the sensory and emotional experience of actually consuming it. Imagery sustains motivation 
because it is emotionally charged (Bywaters, Andrade & Turpin, 2004; Holmes & Mathews, 
2005). So, when a smoker imagines smoking a cigarette, they are not merely imagining what 
the cigarette would look like and taste like, they are also feeling how pleasurable the taste and 
effects of inhalation would be. An alcoholic anticipating the first drink of the day not only 
visualizes the drink but, by doing so, experiences similar pleasure or relief to actually 
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drinking it. The pleasure or relief felt when imagining substance use may be weaker than the 
real thing – a mere simulacrum. However, at times it may be even stronger than reality, 
because imagery allows us to mentally conjure up our ideal experience, where substance use 
is perfectly rewarding and lacks the inconveniences of everyday life, such as having to stand 
outside in the rain to smoke a cigarette. One smoker has pointed out to us that their imaginary 
cigarette is always the best cigarette they have ever had, and is better by far than the 
subsequent experience.  
The pleasure or relief embodied by the initial image encourages further imagery, but 
imagery also has aversive effects. Imagery enhances awareness of deficit, as when a smoker 
imagines the satisfaction of taking a drag on a cigarette and, by comparison of their imagined 
and actual state, feels more keenly their current discomfort and lack of satisfaction. This is an 
instance of a general phenomenon that imagery-based ‘mental contrasting’ increases 
motivation (Achtziger, Fehr, Oettingen, Gollwitzer & Rockstroh, 2009). When deprivation is 
high and cannot be assuaged, the ensuing worsening of mood stimulates further, increasingly 
vivid and realistic imagery in a downward spiral with spikes of briefly pleasurable imagery 
leading to enhanced awareness of deficit and worsening mood.  
In support of this model, sensory imagery is a consistent feature of people’s subjective 
reports of their craving experiences, for a range of addictive (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994; 
Kavanagh, May & Andrade, 2009; May et al., 2004; Statham, Connor, Kavanagh, et al., 
2011) and non-addictive substances (Harvey, Kemps & Tiggemann, 2005; May et al, 2004) 
and activities (May, Andrade, Kavanagh & Penfound, 2008). Elaborating sensory imagery not 
only extends episodes of craving, it makes the craving more intense, as the images become 
better articulated and more vivid. Particularly in the case of visual imagery, the strength or 
vividness of imagery, and the frequency of imagery, correlates with craving strength. For 
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example, Kavanagh et al. (2009) found that most people with alcohol problems have sensory 
imagery during their strongest craving episodes when they are trying to control their alcohol 
use, with their imagery combining more than two senses on average. The most common 
elements of alcohol imagery are imagining tasting a drink, picturing the drink, and imagining 
swallowing alcohol. As predicted by Elaborated Intrusion theory, frequent sensory imagery is 
associated with stronger and longer-lasting episodes of craving for alcohol (Kavanagh et al., 
2009).  
Imagery favours temptation over abstinence 
Substance use often persists despite good intentions to quit. The central role of sensory 
imagery in craving helps to explain the relative weakness of our good intentions. We argue 
that generalized goals to change our lives, for instance to become healthier, can usually be 
imagined less vividly than can familiar, problematic behaviours, because we have less 
information in memory to draw on, and in particular little sensory information on which to 
base an image of an ideal future self that we have not yet experienced. Not only is less 
sensory information available, there is also a general tendency to use more abstract 
representations when thinking about the future than about more immediate events. In a wide-
ranging review of goal constructs, Austin and Vancouver (1996, p. 345) noted that ‘Goals at 
lower levels of abstraction… are invariably short term, whereas goals at higher levels must be 
longer term’. According to construal level theory, these ‘High-level construals consist of 
general, decontextualized features that convey the essence of information about future events, 
whereas low-level construals include more concrete, contextual, and incidental details.’ 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003, p.403). It is the richness of concrete, incidental details that in part 
determines vividness of imagery (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000). Thus lack of sensory 
information combined with high-level construal means that goals to become healthier are 
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difficult to imagine vividly. Images of habitual substance use are more concrete and proximal, 
making them more vivid and more salient or urgent when faced with a choice to give into an 
urge to use substances, or to resist temptation for better – but hard to imagine - future health.  
More specific behavioural plans (e.g. I’ll get up at 6 tomorrow morning and go for a 
run”) help to address this specificity issue—and the potential utility of these ‘implementation 
intentions’ (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 1996) is discussed further below. However, if the concrete 
plan relates to absence of a behavior (e.g. not smoking) rather than its presence (e.g. going for 
a run instead), we suggest it may be difficult to imagine concretely.  Furthermore, to the 
extent that imagery about the more functional behavior focuses on distal consequences (e.g. 
living longer) rather than immediate ones (e.g. feeling good during the run), it will have less 
emotive power than the dysfunctional behavior (e.g. staying in a warm bed and having a 
cigarette). Indeed—as the example illustrates—there may be some immediately aversive 
aspects to the positive behavior. Unfortunately, it is the essence of dysfunctional behaviours 
that the expected positive consequences tend to be more proximal, concrete and certain than 
the feared negative ones. 
Automatic and controlled cognitive processes in addiction 
In contrast to EI Theory’s conscious role for craving, there is a strong tradition within 
psychology of seeing addictive behaviors as automatic or conditioned, learned initially 
through the positively reinforcing aspects of drugs’ positive or euphoric effects and 
subsequently through negative reinforcement of withdrawal reversal. More recently, the 
incentive-sensitization model argues that addiction to drugs develops through sensitization of 
the brain’s reward system to drug-related stimuli (Robinson & Berridge, 1993). Drug-related 
stimuli become increasingly rewarding, leading to unconscious ‘wanting’ that is distinct from 
pleasure-based ‘liking’. In EI theory, the sense of deficit shown in Figure 1 and its association 
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with the target object or activity form the conscious equivalent of unconscious ‘wanting’ 
described by Robinson and Berridge. Berridge and Robinson (2003) suggested that vivid 
cognitive images of reward might activate ‘wanting’ in the same way as drug-related stimuli. 
We predict that the converse is also true, that ‘wanting’ will trigger vivid imagery, and that 
this imagery will activate the unconscious ‘liking’ pathways. Thus liking and wanting, in their 
conscious and unconscious forms, are normally closely coupled, becoming decoupled only as 
neural adaptations in response to repeated substance use blunt hedonic responses while 
accentuating the impact of deprivation (i.e. ‘wanting’ is strengthened independently of 
‘liking’). We predict that in this case sensory imagery becomes primarily focused on 
anticipated relief rather than pleasure. 
Sometimes, exposure to conditioned stimuli is sufficient to trigger drug use with 
minimal conscious oversight and little or no craving, as when a smoker absent-mindedly 
lights another cigarette before finishing the current one. In this situation substance use is 
automated, with behavior driven by automatically activated action schemas without 
intervention from top-down control processes. In fact, Tiffany’s (1990) theory sees craving as 
an epiphenomenon resulting from the conscious effort required to other inhibit these 
automated action schemas (in the case of abstinence attempts) or to seek solutions when their 
completion is prevented by the environmental or situational context.  In Tiffany’s model, 
craving does not directly cause consumption, but results from consumption’s impossibility; its 
negative connotations still serve as a motivating factor to complete the schema and satisfy the 
desire. 
We would also argue pragmatically that situations where consumption can be carried 
out automatically, without conscious action, are rare, because substance use usually requires 
more complex sequences of behaviors over extended time periods. Conscious mediation is 
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needed to orchestrate these sequences of behavior and to carry them out in the face of 
competing goals. While smokers may have a packet to hand and be able to light up a cigarette 
without conscious awareness of having done so, they are an unusual exception. A more 
typical instance of substance use has multiple steps, at least some of which require planning 
or conscious direction to be successful (e.g. calling a dealer, directing a taxi to a bar). During 
these steps the individual may also have thoughts assessing self-efficacy (‘Can I get it?’ ‘Can 
I resist it?’), or activating expectancies (‘It’d feel great right now’), and have to inhibit 
competing goals (e.g. to be healthier or save money).  
We argue that sensory images provide a highly efficient medium by which we retain 
attention on the goal of obtaining an appetitive target during an extended sequence of 
thoughts and actions, and comparatively evaluate and prioritise competing goals (using 
affective associates of related imagery). If elaboration stops, then the conscious episode of 
craving ends: unconscious activation of drug-related memories and concepts remains, ready to 
trigger another episode, but until then the individual can pursue other goals.  
Clues to tackling craving imagery 
The cognitive psychology of mental imagery explains how imagery can be prevented or 
weakened, while research into craving shows how preventing or weakening mental imagery 
can lead to reductions in craving. 
Mental imagery involves activation of the same brain regions that are activated by 
actual perception: thus, neuroimaging studies show increased activity in visual areas of the 
brain when participants are seeing an object and when they are imagining an object (Ganis, 
Thompson & Kosslyn, 2004; Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim and Alpert, 1995). This ‘mental 
seeing’ also requires retrieval of information from long-term memory (generic knowledge of 
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the shape of a cigarette or colour of whisky, for example, and specific memories of smoking 
or drinking), generation of an image from the information so retrieved, and maintenance of 
that image in consciousness. Retrieval, image generation, and maintenance are carried out by 
the set of cognitive processes that are collectively known as ‘working memory’ (Baddeley, 
1986; Baddeley 2000). Working memory is the means by which we are able to keep 
information consciously in mind while transforming it or using it to achieve some goal. In 
craving, working memory is involved when we work out if we have enough money to buy a 
drink, plan a route to the nearest bar, or imagine ordering and drinking. Accordingly, 
neuroimaging studies show increased activation in brain regions that support working 
memory during substance craving (e.g., Grant et al, 1996).  
Sub-systems of working memory are specialized for processing auditory or visuospatial 
information. Imagining the appearance of a bartender pouring a drink uses visuospatial 
working memory, while imagining the clatter of coins as you win the slot machine jackpot 
uses auditory working memory. These subsystems have limited capacity, so visual imagery 
can be blocked by using visuospatial working memory to remember and tap a pattern on a 
keyboard, whereas auditory imagery is diminished by repeating a phrase aloud (Baddeley & 
Andrade, 2000). Even highly emotive autobiographical memories feel less vivid and less 
distressing (or less pleasurable) if they are recalled while performing a task that loads working 
memory (Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade & May, 2001; Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farrell & 
Holmes, 2009; van den Hout, Muris, Salemink,  & Kindt, 2010; van den Hout, Englehard, 
Smeets, et al 2010).  
People perform less well on working memory tasks when they are craving than when 
they are satiated (Kemps, Tiggemann, & Grigg, 2008). As predicted by EI theory, 
visuospatial working memory tasks are particularly sensitive to effects of craving (Kemps, 
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Tiggemann & Parnell, 2010). The relationship is two-way, so people crave food and drugs 
less strongly when they carry out tasks that require working memory than when they have 
nothing else to do. For example, working memory loads reduce craving in response to 
tempting foods (Van Dillen, Papies & Hofmann, in submission)—consistent with their impact 
on emotional responses more generally (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld & Koole, 2009; Van Dillen & 
Koole, 2007).  For clinical purposes, maintaining a perpetual, general working memory load 
that is sufficient to block craving is impractical, because it would block most normal 
cognitive activity as well as craving. This area of craving research has therefore focused on 
simpler tasks that selectively compete with particular aspects of working memory, specifically 
those needed for craving imagery. The aim is to blunt the craving or provide a brief respite 
rather than eliminating it altogether. 
Visual, gustatory and olfactory imagery tends to be more prevalent in substance use 
than auditory imagery (Kavanagh et al, 2009; May et al, 2004, 2008). Because working 
memory research has focused on visuospatial and auditory modalities rather than those of 
other senses, experimental studies have generally compared the effects on craving of 
performing visual working memory tasks versus auditory or verbal tasks that control for 
generic working memory factors and allow us to test the specific effects of blocking visual 
imagery. Tasks that involve manipulating, remembering or imagining visual information 
make it difficult to visualize drug use simultaneously, and have been shown to lead to lower 
craving than verbal tasks that permit concurrent sensory imagery. Thus imagining neutral 
scenes (e.g., a rose garden) as opposed to neutral sounds (e.g., a telephone ringing) reduces 
cigarette craving in abstinent smokers to the levels reported by smokers who are allowed to 
smoke ad lib before the experiment (May et al, 2010). Imagining unrelated odors is also 
effective (Versland & Rosenberg, 2007), as are non-imagery tasks that require visuospatial 
working memory processes. For example, the development of cigarette craving is inhibited by 
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asking participants to view a changing but irrelevant visual display or to create specific forms 
out of modeling clay or plasticine (spheres, or cubes, or animal shapes) while their hands are 
out of sight (May et al., 2010). This clay modeling task has been shown to interfere with the 
encoding (Stuart, Holmes & Brewin, 2006) and recollection (Andrade, Bosworth & Baugh, in 
submission) of emotional visual material.  
Consistent with the EI theory position that imagery is a general feature of motivation, 
similar findings have been obtained with food craving. These studies have either tested 
hungry participants craving food in general or participants craving chocolate, which is 
associated with rather specific cravings that cannot be satisfied by nutritionally similar foods 
(Michener & Rozin, 1994). This research has shown that craving can be reduced by 
imagining neutral scenes (Kemps & Tiggemann, 2007), by watching a rapidly changing visual 
display (Steel, Kemps & Tiggemann, 2006), and by performing tasks that require spatiomotor 
control as well as visual working memory processes, for example modelling plasticine or 
clay, making side to side eye movements, or tapping a pattern on a keyboard (Andrade, Pears, 
May & Kavanagh, under review; Kemps, Tiggemann, Woods & Soekov, 2004). 
In excess, imagery can lead to satiation rather than desire, thus Morewedge, Huh and 
Vosgerau (2010) showed that imagining eating a chocolate sweet thirty times can reduce 
desire for chocolate, compared to imagining repeatedly putting a coin in a slot machine. As 
with imaginal exposure treatments for conditions such as spider phobia, this effect may be 
due to habituation, with the repeated image losing its emotive power over the course of the 
task, in much the same way that actually eating thirty chocolate sweets would exhaust their 
appeal, or saying a word over and over dissociates it from its meaning. Alternatively, the 
effect may occur through imaginary fulfillment of the goal to eat chocolates, as uncompleted 
goals remain hyper-accessible (Förster, Liberman & Higgins, 2005) and therefore liable to 
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trigger intrusive thoughts and craving (Berry, Andrade, May & Kavanagh, 2009). While 
repeated imagery appears effective in controlled settings, however, it is difficult to see how 
this could easily be applied in the natural environment, as the person may run an increased 
risk of consumption during early trials (Mischel, Ebbeson & Raskoff-Zeiss, 1972). 
Functional Decision Making: An imagery-based intervention 
Craving is an important target for substance use treatments because it helps to sustain 
addictive behaviours (more cigarettes are smoked ‘to relieve craving’ than for any other 
reason; Piasecki, Robinson & Smith, 2008) and makes quitting difficult. Intense craving can 
occur long after physiological withdrawal symptoms have faded (e.g. because of exposure to 
previously conditioned cues), inducing discomfort and distress. It is an important trigger of 
relapse in people who have quit smoking (Killen & Fortmann, 1997; Shiffman, Engberg, 
Paty, et al., 1997; Zhou, Nonnemaker, Sherrill et al., 2009).  
Several psychological treatments for addictive disorders are efficacious (e.g., Miller & 
Wilbourne, 2002; Tripodi, Bender, Litschge & Vaughn, 2010, in relation to alcohol 
dependence; Nordstrom & Levin, 2007, in relation to cannabis use disorders; Mottillo et al., 
2009 in relation to cigarette smoking), both on their own and combined with pharmacological 
treatments (e.g., Donovan et al, 2008). However, there is room for improvement in 
psychological treatments for craving and relapse prevention.  
One recent approach to improved psychological interventions in addiction has focused 
on precursors of craving and drug use, for example, modifying attentional biases to drug-
related cues (e.g., Fadardi & Cox, 2009; Field & Eastwood, 2005; Schoenmakers et al, 2010). 
Despite arguments that attentional biases result from permanent changes in reward sensitivity 
in addiction (Franken, 2003) and evidence that attentional biases explain relatively little of the 
variance in craving between individuals (Field et al, 2009), trials on the modification of 
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attentional bias have been encouraging (e.g. Fadardi & Cox, 2009). Clinical effectiveness has 
yet to be established in large-scale trials, and it is not yet clear whether observed positive 
effects of attentional retraining are really due to changes in attention or to incidental aspects 
of the training such as encouraging clients to set conscious goals for avoiding being distracted 
by drug-related cues (e.g., Fadardi & Cox, 2009). From EI theory, we would predict that 
attentional bias modification would alter the probability of experiencing an intrusive thought 
about drug use, but would not necessarily alter the strength of craving should a thought occur 
and be elaborated. 
These interventions aim to reduce the likelihood that drug-related cues will lead to 
craving. Another potential focus is the link between the cue or craving, and the subsequent 
problematic behaviour. Consciously directed behaviour has of course been the focus of 
psychological interventions for some decades, but more recent approaches attempt to focus on 
overlearned or automated response tendencies. So, tendencies to approach alcohol can be 
reduced, by training people to reduce the size of alcohol pictures on a computer screen by 
pushing a joystick (Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker & Lindenmeyer, 2011).  The effect can occur 
outside awareness, if the task focuses on responses to an irrelevant aspect of the stimulus (e.g. 
whether it is presented in landscape or portrait format). We await further published data on 
the extent this effect is maintained outside the laboratory.  
An alternative way to address links with behaviour involves increasing the cognitive 
availability of health-promoting behaviours—for example, by encouraging people to 
articulate and rehearse detailed  ‘implementation intentions’. Implementation intentions are 
specific plans for responding to a particular cue: for example, ‘when my friend offers me a 
cigarette, I shall say ‘no’ and chew some gum instead’. Implementation intentions are 
effective across a range of behaviours (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 1996), including binge drinking 
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(Murgraff, White & Phillips, 1996) and cigarette smoking in adolescents with relatively weak 
smoking habits.  However, positive effects have not been demonstrated for people with 
stronger cigarette habits (Webb, Sheeran & Luszczynska, 2009), and their power to provide a 
stand-alone intervention for other well-established addictive behaviours has yet to be 
demonstrated.  
A potential problem with using implementation intentions to alter addictive behaviours 
is that cues to the desired behaviour (saying ‘no’ in the example above) are also cues to the 
undesired behaviour (accepting the cigarette). This is an instance of the more general problem 
that people have competing goals – to be healthy and to join in with friends who are smoking, 
to drive home safely and to relax with another drink. As discussed above, healthier goals are 
often more abstract, less familiar and more distant in time, whereas the less healthy goals are 
more immediate and more concrete. According to EI theory, we give into temptations even 
when consciously considering our actions because we can imagine the pleasures of indulging 
in familiar habits much more vividly than we can imagine performing a new behaviour or 
achieving a long-term goal. Recent work by Knäuper, in the context of improving dietary fruit 
intake, shows that implementation intentions can be made more effective by encouraging 
people to visualise vividly each component of their ‘if…then’ plan (Knäuper et al, 2011), in 
other words boosting the vividness of the new behaviour.  
Taking these and other ideas from EI theory, we have been developing a new approach 
to treating addiction, called “Functional Decision Making” (FDM), which encourages clients 
to set concrete, proximal and visualizable goals that can better compete, mentally, with the 
temptations of drug use. Its development is informed by previous research on motivational 
interviewing. 
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Over the last three decades, motivational interviewing (MI, Miller, 1983; Miller & 
Rollnick, 2002) has progressively gained strong empirical support across a wide variety of 
behavioural domains (Dunn, Deroo & Rivara, 2001; Rubak, Sandbaek, Lauritzen, & 
Christenses, 2005), not only as a prelude to other treatment, but as a stand-alone treatment in 
its own right (Miller & Wilbourne, 2002). Using client-centred methods, it encourages people 
to explore their ambivalence towards change, and consider their potential for success in an 
attempt. Existing cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) is amplified, so that concerns about 
current behavior and inconsistencies with self-concepts or life goals are drawn out.  If they 
lack confidence in making a change, they are encouraged to review relevant past successes 
and consider their relevance to the contemplated attempt. The essence is to provide a context 
where people are encouraged to discuss change, but where they direct how far the discussion 
proceeds and whether a decision is made.  
In the Project MATCH study, the largest randomised controlled trial on alcohol 
disorders to date, a four-session version of motivational interviewing (Motivation 
Enhancement Therapy, MET) gave similar outcomes to ten sessions of cognitive-behaviour 
therapy or twelve-step therapy (Project MATCH Research Group, 1997). However, effects on 
tobacco use have been somewhat modest (Hettema & Hendricks, 2010), and there are 
opportunities to further increase its impact. 
Strengths of MI include its provision of a safe and empathic environment in which 
change can be contemplated and where existing concerns are amplified, while avoiding the 
induction of defensive responses (Miller & Rose, 2009). These core features are retained in 
FDM.  However, based on EI theory, we suggest several ways in which a motivational 
approach may be made even more powerful. One aspect of FDM is to increase the role of 
implementation intentions in motivational interviewing. We argue that a close association 
  
20 
between the Stages of Change model (Prochaska & DiClimente, 1983) and MI (Miller & 
Rollnick, 2002; cf. Miller & Rollnick, 2009) has resulted in detailed discussion of change 
planning often being avoided unless the person expresses a wish to change.  As a result, there 
is a risk that consideration of a functional goal may sometimes be insufficiently articulated for 
it to influence subsequent behaviour. In FDM, reviewing the potential benefits and costs of 
behaviour change is routinely preceded by encouragement of a more detailed, hypothetical 
discussion of ways in which change could be implemented than may be typical in standard MI 
with a person who does not form a commitment to change.  
While MI seeks to engage people in behaviour change, it is in essence clinic-based.  So, 
participants are not routinely encouraged to replicate the process of reviewing motivation 
within their natural environment.  FDM represents a systematic generalization of the MI 
process into participants’ everyday life, when they are tempted to engage in dysfunctional 
behaviour.  
Within the clinic, MI brings competing motivations about dysfunctional behaviour and 
its alternatives into simultaneous awareness. Importantly, some participants report that this is 
the first time they have looked at all these factors at once. We argue that in the natural 
environment, competing motivations often vary in their salience through time, to the point 
where ‘ambivalence’ is better characterized as an alternation of motivations. So, at an end-of-
week celebration on a Friday evening, it is considerably harder to think about the downsides 
of alcohol than on Saturday morning. We contend that this ‘empathy gap’ is not only due to 
the influence of ‘visceral factors’ such as physiological drug withdrawal symptoms 
(Loewenstein, 1996): it is also due to the role of imagery in motivation. Positive aspects of 
behaviour control are harder to visualise on Friday evening because they conflict with vivid 
images of alcohol that are easier to bring to mind in that context. These alcohol images have a 
  
21 
mental advantage because they are at least initially rewarding, whereas images of hangovers 
are not. The rewards they promise are also more immediate and may appear more likely than 
the effects of hangover. The generation of imagery about alcohol and its consumption 
consumes working memory capacity, and makes it more difficult to form a rational decision. 
How then can the salience of the benefits of alternative behaviours be enhanced in the natural 
environment? Part of the answer may be to provide more rehearsal opportunities during 
motivational interviewing sessions, by increasing the number of times that participants 
summarise the benefits of behaviour change within sessions, and recall in the temptation 
context may also be enhanced by referring to cue cards that list those benefits. Furthermore, 
MI is in essence hypothetical—it encourages participants to guess the potential advantages of 
behaviour change. Tracking actual positive outcomes and rehearsing those memories and 
future instances of similar events conveys detail and immediacy to those motivations within 
the temptation context.  MI already uses cognitive therapy techniques to help people question 
whether the perceived disadvantages of behaviour control always occur, and whether they are 
necessarily as powerful as the person currently expects (e.g. does alcohol always make you 
more sociable?). A further focus of monitoring is therefore to continue to test positive 
assumptions about the dysfunctional behaviour on any occasions when it recurs.   
However, none of these changes may constitute a substantial alteration of optimal 
existing MI.  A more fundamental contribution from FDM is its explicit application of EI 
theory.  
Because both craving and the decision to use substances are essentially conscious, 
cognitive phenomena, they are susceptible to interference from ongoing cognitive activities. 
The laboratory studies discussed in this paper suggest a range of simple tasks that might be 
useful for reducing the intensity of craving: in particular, tasks that selectively engage 
processes of visuospatial working memory. Extrapolating to everyday life, craving should be 
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reduced by spending a few minutes vividly recollecting a happy memory or scene, making 
models from plasticine or clay, playing Tetris (see Holmes, James, Coode-Bate & Deeprose, 
2009) or even watching a screensaver with high contrast, continually changing visual 
properties. We predict that these interventions will be useful, at least where motivation to beat 
craving is high. A recent field study by Knäuper and colleagues supported this prediction. 
They tested participants who wanted to reduce their consumption of a food or drink for which 
they regularly experienced strong cravings. Participants were instructed to imagine 
performing their favourite activity whenever they experienced a strong craving for food or 
drink. Craving strength and actual consumption were reduced in this condition compared with 
a control condition where participants recited the alphabet backwards whenever they 
experienced a strong craving (Knäuper, Pillaya, Lacaillea, McCollama & Kelsoa, in press). 
FDM takes these ideas a step further, by applying them within an MI framework. MI 
does not routinely incorporate imagery.  In contrast, FDM encourages participants to use 
imagery to increase the incentive value of competing, healthy goals by making them more 
frequently and vividly imagined. Rather than using any positive image to interfere with 
craving imagery, FDM uses images that are derived from the MI process. As already noted, 
the disadvantages of substance use are aversive to rehearse and are likely to be avoided. 
Accordingly, FDM focuses on imagery about the advantages of behaviour control, and of 
pleasurable goals that are inconsistent with substance use. Participants are encouraged to 
generate a series of images about the benefits they expect to receive from changing their 
behaviour, and to rehearse these images within sessions and in the natural environment.  
Where possible, we focus on proximal, probable and highly valued benefits of behaviour 
change (e.g. responses of their partner to coming home sober), which offer the best chance of 
competing with the affective power of craving. When positive outcomes of control are 
experienced, they are rehearsed in imagination: Projecting memories of actual events into the 
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future is likely to maximise the credibility, vividness and affective power of that imagery.   
Since novel, episodic imagery is more effortful and more demanding of working memory, the 
emphasis of all the imagery is on variations of unfolding past and future events, rather than on 
static, unchanging pictures or mere rehearsal of past events.  
Similarly, when considering the likely benefits of change within the session, 
participants are encouraged to create detailed imagery about that change. If they later decide 
to implement change, we encourage them to rehearse the steps of their change plan in 
imagination, together with behavioural solutions to potential problems. We argue that this 
detailed imagery about their implementation intentions will boost self-efficacy and help to cue 
behaviours both via its episodic nature and by associations with environmental stimuli 
embedded in it. If rehearsal of implementation intentions, change plans and the benefits of 
change were to focus on imagery, EI theory predicts that this imagery will offer much more 
powerful support for adherence to functional goals than a verbal consideration of benefits or 
plans. We are currently conducting trials of FDM, to demonstrate its ability to enhance other 
motivational methods. 
Thought acceptance and mindfulness 
FDM deals with disrupting the link between intense desire and substance use. A further 
focus of EI-based treatment is on an earlier stage in the craving cycle, disrupting the tendency 
of intrusive thoughts to trigger elaboration in the first place.  
Simple thought suppression is counterproductive, due to ironic effects of thought 
monitoring (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). A more effective strategy may be to 
use acceptance-based or meditation mindfulness (Kabat-Zinn, 2003), which encourages 
individuals to view thoughts as transient events and to accept that unwanted thoughts will 
sometimes pop into mind. Letting thoughts come and go again breaks the cycle of attempted 
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thought suppression, increased thoughts, feelings of failure or rumination on the thoughts, and 
renewed but counterproductive suppression. In addiction, the aim is to help participants see 
that there is no need to elaborate a thought about substance use, because it will go again of its 
own accord. A thought about a substance is not a sign that they need and must have the 
substance – it is just a thought. 
Mindfulness-based therapies teach individuals to become aware of their whole, 
changing, sensory experience. Training in mindfulness aims to increase awareness of all 
thoughts and sensations, and thereby decrease the salience, and elaboration of, unwanted 
thoughts. Mindfulness-based interventions also reduce distress about the craving, by helping 
the person to observe their thoughts without engaging with them or being concerned about 
what they may mean. Bowen, Witkiewitz, Dillworth et al (2006) found that prison inmates 
who took part in a mindfulness course while incarcerated reported significantly less use of 
alcohol, cocaine and marijuana in the three months following their release. Witkiewitz and 
Bowen (2010) reported that craving mediated the relationship between negative affect 
(depressive symptoms) and alcohol or drug use in a control group of substance abusers 
undergoing treatment as usual, but that this relationship was abolished in an experimental 
group undergoing mindfulness based intervention. Zgierska, Rabago, Chawla et al., (2009) 
conducted a systematic review of the efficacy of mindfulness meditation based interventions 
for substance use disorders, and found that the majority showed positive outcomes compared 
to baseline or other therapy, although the variety of interventions made a definitive conclusion 
premature. Of particular relevance for our argument, this review noted that the mindfulness 
approaches differed to conventional cognitive behavioural therapies through the focus upon 
providing the client with the skills to control their responses to thoughts, rather than targeting 
antecedent cues in an attempt to reduce substance related thoughts. 
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Future directions for craving interventions 
Mindfulness training includes strategies such as body scanning that help increase 
awareness of experiences and thoughts other than the unwanted ones. Body scanning involves 
shifting attention from one part of one’s body to another, a process that is likely to involve – 
or be enhanced by - visual imagery of the attended parts of the body. Recent studies have 
shown that body scanning reduces intrusive thoughts about food as effectively as a distraction 
technique involving guided sensory imagery of a woodland walk (May, Andrade, Berry, 
Batey, Kavanagh 2010), that it reduces desire to smoke compared with listening to a natural 
history tape, and that it can be used effectively and unsupervised by people at home (Ussher, 
Cropley, Playle, Mohidin & West 2009). These studies used pre-recorded audio-tapes, but 
with practice people can conduct body scanning without such aids, and future research could 
evaluate the effectiveness of self-guided body scanning in reducing cravings. 
Interventions like body scanning, which combine positive or neutral sensory imagery 
with acceptance of intrusive thoughts, should be particularly effective at reducing craving, 
because the acceptance component should reduce the likelihood of intrusions being elaborated 
while the competing imagery and attentional control elements simultaneously disrupt any 
elaboration that does occur by competing for visuospatial and executive working memory 
resources. The intervention as a whole therefore promises to break the vicious circle whereby 
intrusive thoughts trigger sensory imagery that in turn triggers further thoughts. As Ussher et 
al (2009) showed, these techniques have potential as self-help tasks that can be used at home 
with minimal training. 
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Conclusions 
Sensory imagery is central to craving, providing its emotional bite and prolonging 
episodes of craving in the face of competing desires to abstain. Stronger, more vivid imagery 
predicts stronger craving, while blocking imagery with specific competing tasks has been 
shown to reduce craving. The development of substance craving can be inhibited by clinical 
interventions such as mindfulness training that disrupt the elaboration of intrusive thoughts, 
reducing substance-related sensory imagery. We anticipate that Functional Decision Making, 
a new clinical approach based on multi-sensory imagery of personally relevant positive 
aspects of behaviour control, will enhance the individual’s ability to avoid dysfunctional 
behaviour at the critical moments when they are most tempted. 
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Figure caption 
Figure 1. The Elaborated Intrusion theory of motivation, showing the contribution of 
triggers (rounded external boxes), intrusive thoughts (‘desire thoughts’), and sensory imagery 
to craving (central square box). Thick arrows show the controlled processing cycle of 
conscious imagery and associated affect; thin arrows represent automatic influences on desire 
(reprinted from Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005, with permission). 
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